The Journal of Finance

Good‐Specific Habit Formation and the Cross‐Section of Expected Returns

Published: 02/22/2016   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12397

JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN

I study asset prices in a general equilibrium framework in which agents form habits over individual varieties of goods rather than over an aggregate consumption bundle. Goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms whose elasticities of demand depend on consumers' habit formation. Firms that produce goods with a high habit level relative to consumption have low demand elasticities, set high prices for their product, have low expected returns on their stock, and have low asset pricing betas and stock return volatilities. I find supportive evidence for these predictions in the data.

Real Anomalies

Published: 03/18/2019   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12771

JULES H. van BINSBERGEN, CHRISTIAN C. OPP

We examine the importance of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies (alphas) for the real economy. To this end, we develop a novel quantitative model of the cross‐section of firms that features lumpy investment and informational inefficiencies, while yielding distributions in closed form. Our findings indicate that anomalies can cause material real inefficiencies, which raises the possibility that agents who help eliminate them add significant value to the economy. The model shows that the magnitude of alphas alone is a poor indicator of real outcomes, and highlights the importance of the alpha persistence, the amount of mispriced capital, and the Tobin's q of firms affected.

Regulation of Charlatans in High‐Skill Professions

Published: 02/06/2022   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13112

JONATHAN B. BERK, JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN

We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.

Predictive Regressions: A Present‐Value Approach

Published: 07/15/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01575.x

JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, RALPH S. J. KOIJEN

We propose a latent variables approach within a present‐value model to estimate the expected returns and expected dividend growth rates of the aggregate stock market. This approach aggregates information contained in the history of price‐dividend ratios and dividend growth rates to predict future returns and dividend growth rates. We find that returns and dividend growth rates are predictable with R2 values ranging from 8.2% to 8.9% for returns and 13.9% to 31.6% for dividend growth rates. Both expected returns and expected dividend growth rates have a persistent component, but expected returns are more persistent than expected dividend growth rates.

The Cost of Debt

Published: 11/09/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01611.x

JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, JOHN R. GRAHAM, JIE YANG

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.

Optimal Decentralized Investment Management

Published: 07/19/2008   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01376.x

JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, MICHAEL W. BRANDT, RALPH S. J. KOIJEN

We study an institutional investment problem in which a centralized decision maker, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO), for example, employs multiple asset managers to implement investment strategies in separate asset classes. The CIO allocates capital to the managers who, in turn, allocate these funds to the assets in their asset class. This two‐step investment process causes several misalignments of objectives between the CIO and his managers and can lead to large utility costs for the CIO. We focus on (1) loss of diversification, (2) unobservable managerial appetite for risk, and (3) different investment horizons. We derive an optimal unconditional linear performance benchmark and show that this benchmark can be used to better align incentives within the firm. We find that the CIO's uncertainty about the managers' risk appetites increases both the costs of decentralized investment management and the value of an optimally designed benchmark.